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The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) exhaustion
requirement applies an administrative exhaustion requirement to suits challenging prison conditions. I have argued
elsewhere that corrections rules and procedures should
not be immune from regular administrative law principles.2 This article, inspired by Justice Breyer’s concurrence
in Woodford v. Ngo,3 is a plea to take administrative law
seriously in cases involving PLRA exhaustion.
The PLRA exhaustion requirement provides: “No
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law,
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are
available are exhausted.”4
In 2006, in Woodford, the Supreme Court interpreted
this provision to include a procedural default component,
so that a procedural misstep in a prison grievance procedure (e.g., a missed deadline) can preclude courts from
hearing a prisoner’s claim.5
Concurring in the judgment in Woodford, Justice
Breyer, a former professor of administrative law and
author of an influential textbook in the area,6 wrote that he
agreed with the majority that “Congress intended the term
‘exhausted’ to ‘mean what the term means in administrative law, where exhaustion means proper exhaustion.’”7
He explained, “I do not believe that Congress desired a
system in which prisoners could elect to bypass prison
grievance systems without consequences.”8
However, Justice Breyer took the administrative law
reasoning one step further than the majority, writing that
“[a]dministrative law . . . contains well-established exceptions to exhaustion.”9 He listed some of those exceptions,
including constitutional claims, futility, hardship, and
“inadequate or unavailable” administrative remedies.10
Breyer’s concurrence then noted that some courts, including the Second Circuit, already had “concluded that the
PLRA’s proper exhaustion requirement is not absolute.”11
This article makes the case that, as long as the statutory
language of the PLRA remains as currently enacted, courts
should heed Justice Breyer’s concurrence. Part I provides
context by discussing criticisms of the PLRA exhaustion
requirement and proposed legislative and regulatory
reforms. Part II examines Justice Breyer’s Woodford

concurrence and court decisions consistent with it. Building on the work of Professor Richard Pierce in his
Administrative Law Treatise,12 and other commentators
including John Boston,13 it argues that the PLRA invokes
regular administrative law doctrine to the extent it is not
inconsistent with the statute. The article concludes that Justice Breyer’s Woodford concurrence sketches the proper
approach to interpreting the PLRA exhaustion requirement.
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I. Proposed Legislative and Regulatory Reform of
the PLRA

School of Law

Much has been written about the PLRA exhaustion
requirement. Some advocates and commentators (and Justice Stevens in his Woodford dissent14) say that serious
abuses will go unchecked following Woodford. They point
to cases involving juveniles, sexual abuse, and religious
freedom to argue for elimination of the exhaustion
requirement.15 State attorneys general counter that without an exhaustion requirement with teeth, prisoners will
skip over administrative grievance procedures and head
straight to court.16
Advocates have proposed a legislative solution to the
excesses of PLRA exhaustion—simply amend the statute.
Bills have been introduced to Congress, and the ABA supports this approach. Regulatory changes also have been
proposed, particularly under the auspices of the Prison
Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA).17
A.

Proposed Legislative Amendment

The Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2009, a bill introduced
by Rep. Robert Scott (D-VA), proposed a solution that
required only “presentation” of a claim to corrections
authorities within the “generally applicable statute of limitations period,”18 thus doing away with any procedural
default component added by Woodford. However, PARA
did not completely dispense with an exhaustion requirement. Under the bill, courts were usually required to stay
a prisoner’s lawsuit for ninety days if this requirement had
not been met to permit prison officials to consider the
grievance: whether they considered it was up to them.19
The bill did not leave committee.20
The ABA in its 2010 Standards on the Treatment of Prisoners has called for rules that would permit courts to stay
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an action for up to ninety days for a prisoner to exhaust an
administrative grievance procedure.21 The ABA version,
unlike PARA, does not state expressly that prisoners can
satisfy the PLRA exhaustion provision through “presenting” a claim within the statute of limitations.
B.

Proposed Regulatory Solutions

The PREA created a National Prison Rape Elimination
Commission to study the problem of prison sexual violence and propose standards to the Department of Justice
(DOJ).22 Following further notice-and-comment periods,
the DOJ currently is in the process of finalizing its PREA
regulations.23 During this process of promulgating PREA
regulations, both the NPREC and the DOJ have addressed
the issue of PLRA exhaustion.
Among the standards proposed by the NPREC in its
2009 report was a modification of the exhaustion requirement in sex abuse cases. The NPREC would deem any
complaint of sex abuse to be exhausted at the time that the
corrections agency completed its investigation or, at the latest, within ninety days of when the complaint was made.24
Thus, in essence, the NPREC’s proposed regulations dictated the meaning of “exhaustion” in cases involving
allegations of sex abuse. The NPREC’s proposed standard
also expressly permitted complaints from any source—
including family or outside agencies—as opposed to
restricting complaints solely to prisoners.25 It also permitted an emergency procedure, deeming an urgent request
for protection to be exhausted within forty-eight hours.26
During the period for notice-and-comment on the proposed regulations, corrections officials criticized this
standard as inconsistent with the PLRA mandate.27 They
further complained that such a rule “would allow filing of
stale claims [of sexual abuse] that would be difficult to
investigate due to the passage of time.”28
In response, the DOJ proposed PREA regulations taking a very different tack. The DOJ’s proposed regulations
impose a twenty-day time limit in which prisoners must
file grievances regarding sexual abuse,29 which follows the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) time limit.30 While the NPREC
proposal deemed complaints of sexual abuse “exhausted”
no matter when they were filed, under the DOJ proposal,
prisoners are permitted an extra ninety days in which to
file a grievance if they provide documentation that filing
within twenty days was “impractical,” due to transfer,
trauma, or some other circumstance.31 Some commentators criticize this extension as unrealistic and unlikely to
help prisoners in the worst situations—those subject to
intimidation or retaliation, and those denied treatment or
documentation.32
The DOJ’s proposed regulations would treat complaints from someone other than the prisoner as the initial
stage of the grievance process, although unlike the
NPREC version, the DOJ’s would require the prisoner to
complete subsequent steps of the process.33 The DOJ regulations also provide that corrections authorities should set
up systems for the parents or guardians of juveniles to file
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complaints.34 The DOJ stopped short of adopting the
NPREC recommendation to deem emergency requests to
be exhausted after forty-eight hours.35 However, it did
require agencies to establish emergency grievance procedures for handling claims of imminent sexual abuse.36
Both the NPREC and the proposed DOJ PREA regulations would apply only in cases involving prison sexual
violence or custodial sexual abuse. Accordingly, they do not
address many other important types of prison cases, such
as excessive force, inadequate medical or mental health
treatment, and dangerous environmental conditions.
II. Justice Breyer’s Solution: More Administrative Law

Unless the language of the PLRA is amended, and in cases
that do not implicate the PREA regulations, courts and
advocates should look to Justice Breyer’s Woodford concurrence. At first blush, Justice Breyer’s suggestion that
courts apply regular administrative law exceptions to
PLRA exhaustion may seem inconsistent with decisions of
the Supreme Court interpreting the PLRA,37 particularly
its 2001 opinion Booth v. Churner38 and its 2002 decision
Porter v. Nussle.39 However, it can be reconciled easily if
understood to mean that the PLRA exhaustion provision
references administrative law principles that are not
inconsistent with the statute.
The opinion in Booth, in particular, appears at least
superficially discordant with Justice Breyer’s Woodford
concurrence.40 In Booth, the Court concluded that the
PLRA exhaustion is required even if the prisoner seeks a
remedy, such as money damages, that cannot be obtained
in the prison grievance system.41 The prisoner in Booth
and his amici had argued that exhaustion should not be
required in this situation under the traditional futility
exception to administrative exhaustion requirements.42
The Court rejected this claim, concluding that the PLRA
mandated exhaustion “regardless of the relief offered
through administrative procedures.”43 In the final footnote
of the opinion, the Court explained, “[W]e will not read
futility or other exceptions into statutory exhaustion
requirements where Congress has provided otherwise.”44
The decision in Booth was followed the next year by
Porter. While “[o]rdinarily, plaintiffs pursuing civil rights
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court,”45 the Porter
Court acknowledged that the PLRA mandates administrative exhaustion in “all inmate suits about prison life.”46
In reaching its conclusion in Porter, the Supreme Court
contrasted the PLRA exhaustion provision with its
predecessor, enacted in 1980 in the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA).47 The 1980 CRIPA
exhaustion provision vested courts with discretion to stay
prisoners’ suits for up to 180 days to permit exhaustion of
administrative remedies, if the court believed it “appropriate and in the interests of justice” and the prison grievance
procedure was certified as “plain, speedy, and effective”
under federal standards.48 The PLRA exhaustion provision, wrote Justice Ginsburg, “differ[ed] markedly from its
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predecessor.”49 Under the PLRA, exhaustion was “mandatory,” rather than discretionary, and required regardless of
whether grievance procedures met federal standards.50
Against this backdrop, the result in Booth can be
understood as the Court’s recognition of Congress’s
implicit overruling of the pre-PLRA opinion McCarthy v.
Madigan.51 In McCarthy, the question was whether a federal prisoner seeking money damages was required to
exhaust BOP grievance procedures.52 The McCarthy Court
rejected the argument that CRIPA indicated a congressional preference for exhaustion, in part because CRIPA
applied to state but not federal prisoners,53 and also
because the “effective administrative remedies” language
of the CRIPA statute excluded grievance procedures that
did not provide the relief sought by the inmate.54 The
Court noted in McCarthy that “Congress has not meaningfully addressed the appropriateness of requiring
exhaustion in this context.”55 It concluded that the inmate
was not required to exhaust.56 Four years after McCarthy,
Congress passed the PLRA, eliminating the reference to
“plain, speedy, and effective” administrative remedies in
CRIPA.57 Analyzing the amended statute in Booth in 2001,
the Court wrote, “It has to be significant that Congress
removed the very term we had previously emphasized in
reaching the result Booth now seeks, and the fair inference to be drawn is that Congress meant to preclude the
McCarthy result.”58
However, the fact that the PLRA imposes an “invigorated” exhaustion requirement59 and makes exhaustion
“mandatory” rather than a matter of judicial discretion60—even the fact that it requires exhaustion in cases
involving money damages—does not mean that the statute suspends all aspects of administrative law doctrine.
While the question of whether a prisoner must exhaust is
no longer committed entirely to the court’s judgment,
Professor Richard Pierce argues that the PLRA does not
abolish established administrative law exceptions to the
duty to exhaust.61 In his Administrative Law Treatise, Pierce
explains: “Courts interpret general references to the duty
to exhaust as mere codifications of the common law duty,
subject to the usual pragmatic judge-made exceptions to
the duty.”62 Surveying case law, Pierce concludes that the
PLRA “codifies the common law duty to exhaust,” rather
than creating an “independent, jurisdictional, statutory
duty to exhaust.”63 Pierce writes that Breyer’s Woodford
concurrence directs the lower court to “determine whether
the plaintiff’s complaint fell within an exception to the
duty to exhaust that Congress implicitly incorporated in
the statute at issue.”64 After a review of Booth, one aspect
of Breyer’s Woodford concurrence, and of Pierce’s discussion of it, seems especially deserving of emphasis:
administrative law doctrine is incorporated into the PLRA
exhaustion requirement to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the statute.65
Justice Breyer’s concurrence cites a 2004 Second Circuit
precedent, Giano v. Goord, as an example of how courts may
recognize established exceptions.66 Giano recognized that

“[s]pecial circumstances may exist that amount to a justification for not complying with administrative procedural
requirements.”67 However, the Second Circuit declined to
adopt wholesale doctrine from other areas, specifically the
law of federal habeas.68 It explained: “What is justification
in the PLRA context for not following procedural requirements . . . cannot be decided by borrowing from other areas
of the law. It must be determined by looking at the circumstances which might understandably lead usually
uncounselled prisoners to fail to grieve in the normally
required way.”69
The same day that it decided Giano, the Second Circuit
issued an opinion in a companion case, Hemphill v. New
York,70 that set out a three-part framework to determine
whether a prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust may be
excused. Under Hemphill, a court is to inquire “whether
administrative remedies were in fact ‘available’ to the prisoner,” whether defendants either failed to raise exhaustion
or are estopped from doing so because of “actions inhibiting the inmate’s exhaustion of remedies,” and whether,
within the meaning of Giano, “special circumstances have
been plausibly alleged that justify the prisoner’s failure to
comply with administrative procedural requirements.”71
The Second Circuit concluded that the test for determining whether grievance procedures were “available” is
objective: whether “a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness [would] have deemed them available.”72
Following Woodford, the Second Circuit noted in one case
that it did not need to decide whether Woodford called into
question its Hemphill framework.73
Other circuit courts have recognized important exceptions to exhaustion after Woodford. Most recently, the
Tenth Circuit in Tuckel v. Grover cited the Second Circuit,
along with the Seventh74 and Eleventh,75 in concluding
that “intimidation or threats by prison officials can render
an administrative remedy unavailable under the PLRA’s
exhaustion provision.”76 Like the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits,77 the Tenth Circuit tied its analysis to the “available remedies” language of the PLRA.78 Rejecting the
defendants’ reliance on language from Woodford that
exhaustion under the PLRA is no longer committed to
judges’ discretion, the Tenth Circuit pointed out that
“[t]hroughout Woodford, the Court is careful to acknowledge that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies only
to ‘available’ remedies.”79 The Tenth Circuit emphasized
that its “holding concerns when remedies are available”
but does not permit courts “discretion to fabricate exceptions” to the exhaustion requirement.80
More generally, Justice Breyer’s concurrence suggests
that administrative law principles beyond recognized
exceptions to exhaustion doctrine apply to PLRA exhaustion. Administrative exhaustion is designed to “protect[]
administrative agency authority” and to “promote[] efficiency.”81 However, it also imposes some obligations on
agencies. For example, Professor Pierce notes that “in a
long line of cases, the [Supreme] Court has excused the petitioner from exhausting available administrative remedies
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when the petitioner challenges the constitutionality of some
feature of the agency’s decision-making process.”82 In the
prison context, in which the grievance system is a relatively
informal process administered by the defendants in prisoners’ civil rights suits, this might be an important
consideration.83 After all, the Woodford majority recognized
that prison systems that “create procedural requirements
for the purpose of tripping up all but the most skillful prisoners” might be subject to challenge.84

16

17

III. Conclusion

18

Under the current statutory framework, Justice Breyer’s
solution to the problem of PLRA exhaustion is the most
intellectually coherent approach. It does not require creation of new administrative deadlines or rules applying to
particular categories of cases. It rests on a simple premise:
if the PLRA exhaustion requirement imports administrative law into the prison context, then relevant administrative
law doctrines apply, so long as they are not inconsistent
with the statute. This is a fair reading of the PLRA exhaustion requirement, one that furthers its aims while avoiding
unintended consequences.
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